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Iran, US and the Security Dilemma

Iran, US and the Security Dilemma


Theories that explain nuclear proliferation are numerous. In international politics, the main actors are states seeking power to ensure security for their survival. The ultimate national interest is power, which is understood in military sense. States are constantly struggling to increase military capabilities for security and defense, which creates security dilemma and fuels arms race ((Udum, 2006).

Such is the case with Iran which is presently involved in conducting nuclear tests and as a result, is facing hostile responses from the United States and its allies. Iran in its defense is arguing that nuclear technology is its inalienable right for peace purposes (WMD, 2005). It is evident that Iran's efforts are focused both on uranium enrichment and a parallel plutonium effort. Iran claims it is trying to establish a complete nuclear fuel cycle to support a civilian energy program (WMD, 2005). The United States believes that Iran wants to process uranium to make nuclear weapons and says that Iran has deceived the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Consequently, Iran faces threats of economic sanctions if it does not bring its uranium enrichment activities to a halt.

Iran's situation can be viewed using Rousseau's Stag Hunt. 1) Iran can choose to cooperate and trap the stag, i.e. indulge in cooperation and disarmament; 2) chase a rabbit while others take their positions, i.e. maintain a high level of arms while other states are disarmed; 3) all chase rabbits, i.e. all states engage in arms competition and the run the
risk of war; and 4) stay at the original position while other chase rabbits, i.e. Iran can choose to disarm while other states are armed (Jervis, 1978).

Stag Hunt, however, does not provide solution to cover certain potential threats that international politics pose. Firstly, if US choose to cooperate now, will it continue to do so? No matter how intensely the government of the United States is committed to cooperating with Iran, minds can be changed, new leaders can come to power, and new dangers can arise. This particular insecurity instills an element of fear in Iran which makes it likely for Iran to defect, thereby leading to a halt in disarmament. Moreover, another problem present in international politics but not in the Stag Hunt is the security dilemma (Jervis, 1978). Many of the means by which Iran tries to increase its security decrease the security of the United States. Often in international politics, one state's gain in security inadvertently threatens others. Likewise, if Iran performs nuclear tests, United States does feel insecure and threatened by such an act.

Iran in its nuclear tests can potentially have either offensive or defensive incentives to defect from the coalition of others. Iran’s security dilemma can be analyzed by using the game theory.

Source: Jervis, 1978.
A game is a decision situation where more than one decision agent is involved. A participant of the game is called a player. Each player may only undertake certain actions. The payoff that each player receives from the game is dependent on the actions of all players (Friesner, Axelsen, 2006).

In the above game theory matrix, Iran can either choose to cooperate with the US or defect and continue conducting nuclear tests. What makes it more likely that both US and Iran will cooperate and arrive at CC? The chances of achieving this outcome will be increased by a) anything that increases incentives to cooperate (CC), for example, there will be no war on Iran and/or b) decreasing the costs that Iran will pay if it cooperates when the US does not (CD), for example, imposing lesser sanctions on Iran. The fear of being exploited drives the security dilemma. It all depends on the costs of CD. The relatively lower costs of CD give Iran a margin of time and error and it can watch actions of US before taking the initiative itself. When the costs of CD are tolerable, not only is security easier to attain, but also it is less threatening for the US.

Defensible borders, large size, and protection against sudden attack not only aid the state, but facilitate cooperation that can be beneficial for all states (Jervis, 1978). The cost of CD determines the fate of sovereignty. The higher the cost, the greater is the impact of the security dilemma.

Another aspect of security is the perception of threat, that is, whether the other state will cooperate. If Iran sees US as its adversary, it will react more quickly and strongly in terms of tightening its security measures than would be the case if it holds a benign view regarding the US. In increasing the security measures as a response to the aforementioned threat, the main costs are not the price that Iran will pay for its arms, but the sacrifice of potential gains from cooperation (CC) and an increase in the dangers of the needless arms races and wars (CD).

High costs of war and gains from cooperation can ameliorate the impact of the security dilemma, however, this may give rise to another problem. If the costs are high enough and war is the last choice (DD) for both ends, the game can shift to "Chicken" (Jervis, 1978). This condition differs from Stag Hunt in that if it is viewed that the opposing side is going to defect, you have to cooperate. That is, in the state of Chicken, if US is going to defect, Iran will have to cooperate. The argument that supports this condition is that even though Iran will be exploited by the US (CD) which is bad, it is not as bad as could be the case if Iran were to face a total breakdown (DD). This is a disaster-avoidance strategy whereby one state will defect and the other state will cooperate so as to avoid the unfavorable outcome.

The chances of peace are increased in a world in which the prevailing international system is valued in its own right because of the decreased chances that the states will engage in unnecessary conflict out of the quest for security. If there were complete faith in collective security, no state would want an army. By contrast, the security dilemma is fuelled when each state fears that many others are likely to join in any attack (Jervis, 1978).

Jervis enhances understanding of the prevailing Iran-US situation by applying a game theory which elaborates the outcomes and their respective payoffs for the two states. Moreover, the conditions of Stag Hunt and Chicken also enlighten knowledge in terms of how both countries are reacting towards each other and what potential reaction can be expected should circumstances warrant.




REFERENCES

Friesner, D. and Axelsen, D. "Using Game Theory to Teach Principles of Microeconomics". Journal For Economic Educators, Vol. 6, Issue 1, (2006).

Jervis, R. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma". World Politics, Vol.30, Issue 2, (Jan. 1978), pp.167-214.

"Iran and the New Nuclear Dilemma". August 2005
http://www.theage.com.au/news/editorial/iran-and-the-new-nuclear-dilemma/2005/08/11/1123353440995.html (January 27, 2007)

"Iran's Nuclear Program: A Serious Crisis". Weapons of Mass Destruction, U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs, August 2005.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/nuke.htm (January 27, 2007).

Udum, E. "Turkey's Non-Nuclear Weapon Status – Theoretical Assessment". ISYP Conference, (November 2006).
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Posted by: Christie Ingram

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